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Abstract
We examine a reductions approach to fair optimization and learning where a black-box
optimizer is used to learn a fair model for classification or regression [Alabi et al., 2018, Agarwal
et al., 2018] and explore the creation of such fair models that adhere to data privacy guarantees
(specifically differential privacy). For this approach, we consider two suites of use cases: the
first is for optimizing convex performance measures of the confusion matrix (such as G-mean
and H-mean); the second is for satisfying statistical definitions of algorithmic fairness (such as
equalized odds, demographic parity, and the gini index of inequality).
The reductions approach to fair optimization can be abstracted as the constrained group-
objective optimization problem where we aim to optimize an objective that is a function of
losses of individual groups, subject to some constraints. We present two differentially private
algorithms: an (, 0) exponential sampling algorithm and an (, δ) algorithm that uses a linear
optimizer to incrementally move toward the best decision. We analyze the privacy and utility
guarantees of these empirical risk minimization algorithms. Compared to a previous method for
ensuring differential privacy subject to a relaxed form of the equalized odds fairness constraint,
the (, δ) differentially private algorithm we present provides asymptotically better sample com-
plexity guarantees. The technique of using an approximate linear optimizer oracle to achieve
privacy might be applicable to other problems not considered in this paper. Finally, we show
an algorithm-agnostic lower bound on the accuracy of any solution to the problem of (, 0) or
(, δ) private constrained group-objective optimization.
∗Supported by a Facebook Emerging Scholar award.
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1 Introduction
Algorithmic fairness, accountability, and transparency of computer systems have become salient
sub-fields of study within computer science. The incorporation of such values has lead to the
development of new models to make existing and state-of-the-art systems more societally conscious.
But some of these new models don’t adhere to other ethical standards such as the societal need to
ensure the privacy of the data used to create the models.
In this paper, we focus on a reductions approach to fair optimization and learning where a
black-box optimizer is used to learn a fair model for classification or regression ([Alabi et al.,
2018, Agarwal et al., 2018]) and explore the creation of such fair models that adhere to data
privacy guarantees (specifically differential privacy). This approach leads to applications other
than algorithmic fairness. We consider two suites of use cases: the first is for optimizing convex
performance measures of the confusion matrix (such as G-mean and H-mean); the second is for
satisfying statistical definitions of algorithmic fairness (such as equalized odds, demographic parity,
and the gini index of inequality) 1.
We abstract the reductions approach to fair optimization as the constrained group-objective
optimization problem where we aim to optimize an objective that is a function of losses of individual
groups, subject to some constraints. We present two differentially private algorithms: an (, 0)
exponential sampling algorithm and an (, δ) algorithm that uses a linear optimizer to incrementally
move toward the best decision. We analyze the privacy and utility guarantees of these empirical
risk minimization algorithms. Compared to a previous method for ensuring differential privacy
subject to a relaxed form of the equalized odds fairness constraint, the (, δ) differentially private
algorithm provides asymptotically better sample complexity guarantees. The technique of using an
approximate linear optimizer oracle to achieve privacy might be applicable to other problems not
considered in this paper. Finally, we show an algorithm-agnostic lower bound on the accuracy of
any solution to the problem of (, 0) or (, δ) private constrained group-objective optimization.
We focus on differentially private optimization via empirical risk minimization. Generaliza-
tion guarantees can be obtained by taking a large enough sample of the population and of subgroups
of the population2. We do not state any generalization guarantees in this paper. Suppose we have
a dataset S of size n consisting of i.i.d. draws from an unknown distribution D. For example, we
could have S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 that consists of features x1, . . . , xn ∈ X of individuals/objects and la-
bels/values (depending on if the resulting task is for classification, regression, etc.) y1, . . . , yn ∈ Y.
Let C ⊂ RP be a decision set (e.g. corresponding to a set of P -dimensional decision vectors, a set of
classifiers that each can be represented by P real numbers, a set of real coefficients of a polynomial
threshold function, or a set of all possible weights that can be used to represent a specific neural
network architecture).
Suppose there are at most K groups to which any example (x, y) ∼ D can belong to. Let
us consider the marginal distribution over examples in each group so that D1, . . . ,DK are the
marginal distributions over examples in each group. For any decision c ∈ C, we define a loss
function ` : C × (X × Y)n → [0, 1]K to be `(c, S) = (`1(c, S), . . . , `K(c, S)) with `k(c, S) ∈ [0, 1]
for each k ∈ [K]. We assume that K ≤ P and that in most cases (as exemplified by our use
1In this paper, we only consider group-fair definitions but our framework can potentially be extended to individual
fairness notions [Dwork et al., 2012].
2Another option is to consider the complexity (via VC dimension for example) of the hypothesis class to be
learned or the stability properties of the differentially private algorithms since we know that stability implies gener-
alization [Dwork et al., 2015]
2
cases) we have K  P . For example, although a specific neural network architecture might have
P = 1000 weight parameters, K = 20 would be the maximum number of groups the examples
fed to the neural network belong to. Then for any decision c ∈ C, we let `k(c, S) correspond to a
context-specific or application-specific loss for individuals/objects that belong to group k ∈ [K].
We assume that for any group k ∈ [K], the loss `k(c, S) is an average loss of the form `k(c, S) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 `k(c, Si). So `k(c, S) applies to the items in group k ∈ [K] where `k(c, Si) is the loss of c on
item Si = (xi, yi) ∼ Dk. We denote the induced loss set on dataset S as `(C, S) = {`(c, S) : c ∈ C}.
The iterative linear optimization based private algorithm presented in this paper assumes that
`(C, S) is compact and the existence of an approximate linear optimizer oracle. The exponential
sampling private algorithm assumes that `(C, S) is convex.
Further, for any c ∈ C, the true loss on group k is `k(c) = ES∼Dn [`k(c, S)] and the true loss for
all groups is `(c) = (`1(c), . . . , `K(c)). The goal of constrained group-objective optimization is to
minimize the error function f(`(c)) subject to the constraint g(`(c)) ≤ 0 where f, g : [0, 1]K → R
are context-specific or application-specific functions specified by the data curator.
Our differential privacy guarantees will be with respect to the centralized model where a central
and trusted curator holds the data (as opposed to the local or federated model for differentially pri-
vate computation). We now define constrained group-objective optimization and private constrained
group-objective optimization.
Definition 1.1 (Constrained Group-Objective Optimization: CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α)). Let f :
[0, 1]K → R be a function we wish to minimize subject to a constraint function g : [0, 1]K → R.
Specifically, for any excess risk parameter α > 0, decision set C, and any dataset S of size n, we
wish to obtain a decision cˆ ∈ C such that
f(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ min
c∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0
f(`(c, S)) + α, g(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ α. (1)
Any procedure – whether deterministic or randomized – that takes input S and returns a decision
cˆ ∈ C that satisfies Equation 1 is a constrained group-objective optimization algorithm that solves
the problem specified by CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α).
Definition 1.1 is implicit in the work of [Alabi et al., 2018]. A private constrained group-objective
optimization problem is a constrained group-objective optimization problem where the resulting
decision cˆ ∈ C is optimized in a differentially private manner. i.e. satisfying (, 0) or (, δ) differential
privacy or some other notion of data privacy.
We note that Definition 1.1 is a special case of the more general multi-objective optimization
problem, where we usually have multiple, sometimes an exponential number of, optimal solutions
(forming a pareto-optimal set). The constrained multi-objective optimization problem is a more
general problem and we think the direction of adding privacy guarantees to such optimization
problem is interesting. We do not consider this more general problem in this paper and leave it for
future work 3.
In this paper, the algorithms we present assume that the functions f, g are convex and Lips-
chitz. In addition, the linear optimization based algorithm assumes that the gradients of f, g are
Lipschitz4. Our main novel contribution is an (, δ) differentially private algorithm for solving the
constrained group-objective optimization problem and accompanying techniques in the quest for
3See Marler and Arora [2004] for a survey on multi-objective optimization.
4Sometimes referred to as the β-smooth property.
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(a) Approximate Linear Optimizer Oracles
LOPT and LOPTδ. For our applications,
LOPTδ, the oracle satisfying (, δ) differ-
ential privacy, can be constructed from
LOPT.
data privacy. This algorithm essentially implements a differentially private linear optimization ora-
cle (LOPTδ satisfying (, δ) differential privacy) to solve linear subproblems approximately in each
timestep. LOPTδ is implemented via calls to a non-private linear optimizer oracle LOPT. This
process is illustrated in Figure 1a where {c˜1, . . . , c˜T } are the output of the differentially private
linear optimization oracle.
In Section 7, we show applications of our work to two suites of uses cases. The first is for
optimizing convex performance measures of the confusion matrix (such as G-mean and H-mean);
the second is for satisfying definitions of algorithmic fairness (such as equalized odds, demographic
parity, and gini index of inequality).
Now we proceed to state informal versions of some of our main theorems.
Theorem (Informal) 1.2. Suppose we are given any constrained group-objective optimization
problem (Definition 1.1) where f, g are convex, Lipschitz functions. Then for any α > 0, after T =
O(K
4
α2
) iterations (calls to an approximate linear optimization oracle solver oracle), with probability
at least 9/10, we can solve CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α).
Theorem 1.2 (more informal version of Theorem 5.4) shows that for any accuracy parameter
α > 0, we can, after T = O(K
4
α2
) calls to a linear optimization oracle, solve the constrained group-
objective optimization problem to within α, with high probability, provided that f, g are convex,
Lipschitz functions. For this theorem to hold we require access to a linear optimizer oracle LOPT
that can approximately solve linear subproblems of the overall convex optimization problem at each
iteration. We note that Alabi et al. [2018] also achieved this theorem but we reprove it here more
generally (so it is amenable to the additional constraint of data privacy).
Theorem (Informal) 1.3. Suppose we are given any constrained group-objective optimization
problem (Definition 1.1) where f and g are convex, Lipschitz functions and we wish to obtain a
decision c˜ ∈ C in a differentially private manner.
Then there exists n0 = O(
K2
α2
) such that for all n ≥ n0 and privacy parameter  > 0 there is an
 differentially private algorithm that, with probability at least 9/10, returns a decision c˜ ∈ C that
solves the CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α) problem.
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Theorem (Informal) 1.4. Suppose we are given any constrained group-objective optimization
problem (Definition 1.1) where f and g are convex Lipschitz functions with Lipschitz gradients and
we wish to obtain a decision c˜ ∈ C in a differentially private manner.
Then there exists n0 = O˜(
K3
α ) such that for all n ≥ n0 and privacy parameters  ∈ (0, 1], δ ∈
(0, 120 ] there exists an (, δ) differentially private linear optimization based algorithm that after
T = O(n
22
K2
) iterations (calls to a linear optimization oracle solver) will, with probability at least
9/10, return a decision c˜ ∈ C that solves the CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α) problem.
Theorem 1.3 (more informal version of Theorem 5.2) shows that we can use the exponential
mechanism to solve the CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α) problem although an explicit mechanism to sam-
ple from C is not provided. Theorem 1.4 (more informal version of Theorem 5.8) is more explicit
and relies on calls to a linear optimization oracle. Theorem 1.4 shows that there is an (, δ) dif-
ferentially private linear optimization based algorithm that perturbs the linear subproblems solved
in each iteration in order to ensure privacy. Again, we show asymptotic convergence guarantees so
that the excess risk goes to 0 as n→∞. For ease of exposition, the sample complexity guarantees
of Theorem 1.4 are in terms of O˜(·) which hides polylogarithmic factors (including the polyloga-
rithmic dependence on 1δ ). The linear optimization based differentially private algorithm incurs a
multiplicative additional factor of poly(log(n), log(1δ )). We ignore these polylogarithmic factors to
obtain cleaner statements 5.
Theorem (Informal) 1.5. Suppose we are given a constrained group-Objective optimization prob-
lem (Definition 1.1) where f and g are (adversarially chosen) convex functions. Let  > 0, then
for every  differentially private algorithm, there exists a dataset S = {x1, . . . , xn} drawn from the `2
unit ball such that, with probability at least 1/2, in order to solve the problem CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α)
we need sample size n ≥ Ω (Kα).
Theorem (Informal) 1.6. Suppose we are given a constrained group-objective optimization prob-
lem (Definition 1.1) where f and g are (adversarially chosen) convex functions. Let  > 0, δ =
o( 1n), then for every (, δ) differentially private algorithm, there exists a dataset S = {x1, . . . , xn}
drawn from the `2 unit ball such that, with probability at least 1/3, in order to solve the problem
CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α) we need sample size n ≥ Ω
(√
K
α
)
.
Theorems 1.5 and 1.6 (more informal versions of Theorems 6.1 and 6.2) show lower bounds
on the sample complexity for solving the constrained group-objective optimization problem in a
differentially private manner. The lower bounds for achieving (pure)  and (approximate) (, δ)
differential privacy to solve the CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α) problem differs from the upper bounds
(from Theorems 1.3 and 1.4) by multiplicative factors of O
(
K
α
)
and O
(
K2
√
K
)
respectively. An
open problem is to close these gaps. Note that if K is fixed (but the excess risk bound α and privacy
parameters , δ aren’t), then the (, δ) upper bound matches the lower bound.
We note that [Jagielski et al., 2018] considered the problem of differentially private “fair” learn-
ing in which they present a reductions approach to “fair” learning but the oracle-based algorithms
they provide are specific modifications of those provided by Agarwal et al. [2018]. The algorithm
is an exponentiated gradient algorithm for fair classification that uses a cost-sensitive classification
oracle solver in each iteration, which is only be applied to the equalized odds definition. We show an
5Alternatively, one could use concentrated differential privacy [Bun and Steinke, 2016] to obtain cleaner and tighter
composition results.
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approach that applies to more than one definition and to a variety of other applications. Moreover,
the algorithms in this paper results in asymptotically better sample complexity guarantees than
previous work although under different underlying oracle assumptions and for a smoothed version
of the equalized odds definition.
We hope that the generality of our approaches and techniques here will lead to applications in
myriad domains.
1.1 Techniques
Now we proceed to summarize the major techniques we utilize to show the results in this paper.
Our main result is a linear optimization based iterative algorithm that solves the private con-
strained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1). We also provide an exponential
sampling algorithm based on a technique of sampling from a convex set differentially privately
from Bassily et al. [2014]. For our purposes, both algorithms rely on the simple observation that
if we are given two functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R and aim to minimize the function f subject to
the constraint g we could minimize them jointly via a “new” function. Specifically, we define the
function h : [0, 1]K → R where h(x) = f(x) + G ·max(0, g(x)) for all x ∈ [0, 1]K for some setting
of G > 0. Then we could optimize h with privacy in mind. The caveat is that the noise we add
to the gradients of f, g to ensure privacy will depend on the setting of G > 0 (which itself could
be a function of the privacy parameters , δ and of K,n). In fact, this is what we observe. The
(, δ) differentially private algorithm, in each iteration adds noise from the gaussian distribution
with standard deviation that is a function of G. And to optimize both f and g to within α we can
set G = O(
√
K
α ) (for large enough sample size n). Note that this differentially private algorithm is
a first-order iterative optimization algorithm that relies on access to the gradient oracles ∇f,∇g.
Optimization with respect to these gradient oracles is done in a private manner while weighting
∇g by a multiplicative factor of G. As such, we term this strategy weighted private gradients. We
hope that this strategy of differentially private optimization of a function subject to one or more
constraints can be applied to other situations. The weighting of gradients non-privately to solve
the CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α) problem was done by Alabi et al. [2018] but without privacy consid-
erations. The (, δ) algorithm in this paper uses an approximate linear optimizer oracle to solve an
overall convex problem privately – this technique could be applicable in other scenarios.
It is known that differentially private iterative algorithms use the crucial property of (advanced)
composition of differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2010, Dwork and Roth, 2014] which come in a
variety of forms. The iterative algorithms we provide exploit this property. The lower bounds we
provide for empirical risk minimization are modified versions of the ones provided by Bassily et al.
[2014].
1.2 Applications
In Section 7, we expand on the breadth of our applications from optimizing convex measures of the
confusion matrix to satisfying certain definitions from the algorithmic fairness literature. The linear
optimization based algorithm we provide can only be applied to convex Lipschitz functions with
Lipschitz gradients whereas the exponential sampling algorithm can be applied to general Lipschitz-
continuous functions (with additional assumptions on `(C, S)). However we note that even if f, g
are not convex or smooth there exist surrogate convex functions and standard smoothing techniques
that can be applied (e.g. see Manning et al. [2008]).
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We proceed to state an informal corollary that illustrates how to use our theorems. The corollary
serves to compare the method in this paper to that of Jagielski et al. [2018] in satisfying α Equalized
Odds (see Definition 1.7) which is the only fairness definition they consider when satisfying both
privacy and fairness 6. In contrast, the algorithms in this paper can be applied to more than one
kind of fairness definition (although under different oracle assumptions and additional assumptions
like convexity of the loss set `(C, S) and objectives f, g). Also, our linear optimization based
algorithm requires not just convexity but that the gradients of f, g are Lipschitz 7 so we define a
smoothed version of the Equalized Odds definition.
Definition 1.7 (α Smoothed Equalized Odds). Let X,A, Y be random variables representing the
non-sensitive features, the sensitive attribute, and the label of an individual, respectively.
Given a dataset of examples S = {(xi, ai, yi)}ni=1 ∈ (X ,A, {0, 1})n of size n, we say a classifier
c ∈ C satisfies α Equalized Odds if
max
a,a′∈A
{max(|FˆP a − FˆP a′ |, | ˆTP a − ˆTP a′ |)} ≤ α (2)
where FˆP a, ˆTP a are empirical estimates of FPa(c) = P(x,y,a)[c(x) = 1|A = a, y = 0], TPa(c) =
P(x,y,a)[c(x) = 1|A = a, y = 1] respectively on dataset S 8.
We say a classifier satisfies α Smoothed Equalized Odds if the smoothed version of Equation 2 is
satisfied (i.e. when the maximum and absolute functions in Equation 2 are replaced with smoothed
versions 9).
Corollary (Informal) 1.8. For any privacy parameters  ∈ (0, 1], δ ∈ (0, 120 ], suppose we have
a dataset of examples S = {(xi, ai, yi)}ni=1 of size n where xi ∈ X , yi ∈ {0, 1}, ai ∈ A, for all
i ∈ [n]. Suppose we can write the α smoothed equalized odds constraint (by Definition 1.7) and the
empirical error as 1-Lipschitz, 1-smooth functions such that there exists at least one choice c ∈ C
that satisfies this constraint.
Then there exists n0 = O˜
( |A|3
α
)
such that for all n ≥ n0, with probability at least 9/10, we can
obtain a decision c˜ ∈ C satisfying α smoothed equalized odds and that is within α away from the
most accurate classifier after T = O(n
22
|A|2 ) calls to an approximate linear optimizer oracle.
We provide the proof for Corollary 1.8 as Corollary 7.8 in Section 7. Corollary 1.8 uses Theo-
rem 5.8 as the base theorem. In comparison, Jagielski et al. [2018] can satisfy α-Equalized Odds
while returning an hypothesis that is α accurate using sample size O˜
( |A|3
α2
)
. In Section C, we
state their main theorem (Theorem C.1) and a corollary (Corollary C.2) showing the sample com-
plexity required for their algorithm to solve the α-Equalized Odds problem. On the other hand,
Corollary 1.8 results in sample size O˜
( |A|3
α
)
. As a result, by Corollary 1.8, Algorithm 1 performs
better (in terms of asymptotic sample complexity) than the DP-oracle-learner 10 of Jagielski
et al. [2018] Of course, these results hold under different oracle assumptions and for a smoothed
version of the equalized odds constraint. As a result, the comparison isn’t as direct as we would
like.
6Although their methods could probably be applied to other statistical fairness definitions as well.
7Which is sometimes referred to as a β-smooth property.
8FPa(c) is usually referred to as the false positive rate on attribute A = a. Likewise, FNa(c) and TPa(c) are the
false negative and true positive rates on attribute A = a respectively.
9For example, the smooth maximum function is a smooth approximation to the maximum function.
10Which uses a cost-sensitive classification oracle in each iteration of their algorithm.
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2 Other Related Work
Below we briefly specify a few works related to the material presented in this paper.
Reductions Approach to Fair Classification and Regression: Agarwal et al. [2018]
explore the problem of using “black-box” optimizers to minimize “group-fair” convex objectives
subject to constraint functions. Alabi et al. [2018] extend this work to handle more general func-
tions; specifically, they show how to optimize any Lipschitz continuous group objective of losses
given oracle access to an approximate linear optimizer in time polynomial in the inverse of the ac-
curacy parameter. Furthermore, they extend their results to learning using a polynomial number of
examples and access to an agnostic learner. Our definition of the constrained group-objective opti-
mization problem is inspired by the work and results of Alabi et al. [2018]. Additionally, Narasimhan
et al. [2015], Narasimhan [2018] explore optimizing convex objectives of the confusion matrix (such
as G-mean, H-mean typically used for class-imbalanced problems) and fractional-convex functions
of the confusion matrix (such as F1 measure used in text retrieval).
In this paper, we consider some of the use cases explored by previous works but also add on the
additional constraint of data privacy, an important constraint given that fairness is often imposed
with respect to the sensitive attributes of data subjects.
Private Empirical Risk Minimization: Differentially private empirical risk minimization
in the convex setting has been considered in a variety of settings [Wang et al., 2018, Bassily et al.,
2014, Talwar et al., 2015, Kifer et al., 2012, Talwar et al., 2014, Steinke and Ullman, 2015] with
algorithm-specific upper and algorithm-agnostic lower bounds provided in some cases. We largely
build upon these works.
Private Fair Learning: Jagielski et al. [2018] initiates the study of differentially private fair
learning but only considers the equalized odds definition in the reductions approach to fair learning.
Ekstrand et al. [2018] discusses an agenda for subproblems that should be considered when trying
to achieve data privacy for fair learning. Last, Kilbertus et al. [2018] study how to learn models
that are “fair” by encrypting sensitive attributes and using secure multiparty computation.
Other Notions of Data Privacy: In this paper, we focus on developing (, δ) differentially
private algorithms. Certain relaxations of statistical differential privacy exist. For example, in a
recent work Feldman et al. [2018] show new privacy amplification theorems using Renyi differential
privacy as the definition. The (, δ) differentially private algorithms presented in this paper can all
be modified to be stated in terms of Renyi differential privacy [Mironov, 2017] and/or concentrated
differential privacy [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016, Bun and Steinke, 2016].
3 Preliminaries and Notation
Here we introduce preliminaries and notation that might be useful to parse through later sections.
3.1 Differential Privacy
For the definitions below, for any two dataset S, S′ ∈ (X ×Y)n, we use S ∼ S′ to mean that S and
S′ are neighboring datasets that differ in exactly one row.
Definition 3.1 ((Pure)  Differential Privacy [Dwork et al., 2006]). For  ≥ 0, we say that a
(randomized) mechanismM : (X ×Y)n → R is  differentially private if for every two neighboring
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datasets S ∼ S′ ∈ (X × Y)n, we have that
∀T ⊆ R,P[M(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eP[M(S′) ∈ T ].
We usually take  to be small but not cryptographically small. For example, typically we set
 ∈ [0.1, 1]. The smaller  is, the more privacy is guaranteed.
Definition 3.2 ((Approximate) (, δ) Differential Privacy). For  > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], we say that
a (randomized) mechanism M : (X × Y)n → R is (, δ) differentially private if for every two
neighboring datasets S ∼ S′ ∈ (X × Y)n, we have that
∀T ⊆ R,P[M(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eP[M(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
We insist that δ be cryptographically negligible i.e. δ ≤ n−ω(1). The value δ can be inter-
preted as an upper-bound on the probability of a catastrophic event (such as publishing the entire
dataset)[Vadhan, 2017]. (, δ) differential privacy can also be interpreted as “(pure)  differential
privacy with probability at least 1− δ.” The smaller  and δ are, the more privacy is guaranteed.
Definition 3.3 (`1-sensitivity of a function). The `1 sensitivity of a function f : (X × Y)n → RK
is
∆1(f) = max
S,S′∈(X×Y)n:S∼S′
‖f(S)− f(S′)‖1
where S ∼ S′ are neighboring datasets.
Definition 3.4 (`2-sensitivity of a function). The `2 sensitivity of a function f : (X × Y)n → RK
is
∆2(f) = max
S,S′∈(X×Y)n:S∼S′
‖f(S)− f(S′)‖2
where S ∼ S′ are neighboring datasets.
Theorem 3.5 (Laplace Mechanism [Dwork et al., 2006]). For any privacy parameter  > 0 and
any given query function f : (X × Y)n → RK and database S ∈ (X × Y)n, the Laplace mechanism
outputs:
f˜L(S) = f(S) + (R1, . . . , RK)
where R1, . . . , RK ∼ Lap(∆1(f) ) are i.i.d random variables.
The Laplace mechanism is -differentially private.
Theorem 3.6 (Exponential Mechanism [McSherry and Talwar, 2007]). For any privacy parameter
 > 0 and any given loss function ` : C × (X × Y)n → RK and database S ∈ (X × Y)n, the
Exponential mechanism outputs c ∈ C with probability proportional to exp(−`(c,S)2∆` ) where
∆` = max
c∈C
max
S,S′∈(X×Y)n:S∼S′
|`(c, S)− `(c, S′)|
is the sensitivity of the loss function `.
Theorem 3.7 (Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs of Exponential Mechanism [McSherry and Talwar, 2007]).
For any database S ∈ (X×Y)n, let c∗ = argminc∈C `(c, S) and c˜ ∈ C be the output of the Exponential
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Mechanism satisfying  differential privacy. Then with probability at least 1− ρ,
|`(c˜, S)− `(c∗, S)| ≤ log
( |C|
ρ
)(
2∆`

)
.
Theorem 3.8 (Gaussian Mechanism [Dwork and Roth, 2014]). For any privacy parameters  >
0, δ ∈ (0, 1) and any given query function f : (X × Y)n → RK and database S ∈ (X × Y)n, the
Gaussian mechanism outputs:
f˜G(S) = f(S) + (R1, . . . , RK)
where R1, . . . , RK ∼ N (0, σ2) are i.i.d random variables and σ ≥ ∆2(f)
√
2 log(1.25/δ)
 .
The Gaussian mechanism is (, δ)-differentially private.
Lemma 3.9 (Post-Processing [Dwork et al., 2006]). LetM : (X ×Y)n → R be a (, δ) differentially
private algorithm and f : R → T be any (randomized) function. Then f ◦M : (X × Y)n → T is a
(, δ) differentially private algorithm.
The mechanisms above (Laplace, Gaussian, Exponential) will be used as building blocks for
our differentially private algorithms for constrained group-objective optimization. The Laplace or
Gaussian mechanism is often used when the goal is to output estimates to a query (e.g. the mean,
sum, or median) while the Exponential mechanism is used when the goal is to output an object
(e.g. a regressor or classifier) with minimum loss (or maximum utility).
3.2 Convexity, Smoothness, and Oracles
Definition 3.10 (Convex Set). A set X ⊂ Rm is a convex set if it contains all of its line segments.
That is, X is convex iff
∀ (x, y, γ) ∈ X × X × [0, 1], (1− γ)x+ γy ∈ X .
Definition 3.11 (Convex Function). A function f : X → R is a convex function if it always lies
below its chords. That is, f is convex iff
∀ (x, y, γ) ∈ X × X × [0, 1], f((1− γ)x+ γy) ≤ (1− γ)f(x) + γf(y).
Definition 3.12 (Subgradients). Let X ⊂ Rm and define a function f : X → R. Then we say that
g ∈ Rm is a subgradient of f at x ∈ X if for any y ∈ X we have that
f(x)− f(y) ≤ gT (x− y)
We denote ∂f(x) as the set of subgradients of the function f at x ∈ X .
Definition 3.13 (Lipschitz Function). Let X ⊂ Rm. A function f : X → R is L-Lipschitz on X if
for all x, y ∈ X , we have
|f(x)− f(y)| ≤ L‖x− y‖
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Definition 3.14 (β-Smooth Function). Let X ⊂ Rm. A function f : X → R is β-smooth if the
gradient ∇f is β-Lipschitz. That is, for all x, y ∈ X ,
‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖ ≤ β · ‖x− y‖.
Note that if f is twice-differentiable then f being β-smooth is equivalent to the eigenvalues of
its Hessians being smaller than β.
For our iterative algorithms, we assume access to a linear optimizer oracle that can solve sub-
problems of the form
yt ∈ argmin
y∈X
∇f(xt)T y
whether exactly or approximately.
The overall convex optimization problem will be converted into a series of linear subproblems.
A key property of the use of linear optimizers in the (vanilla) Frank-Wolfe algorithm is that the
projection step of projected gradient descent algorithms is replaced with a linear optimization step
over the set X . In some cases, solving linear optimization subproblems will be simpler and more
computationally efficient to solve than projections into some feasible set.
4 Constrained Group-Objective Optimization via Weighting
In this section, we present a key lemma and corollary that will be crucial to the algorithms we will
present in this paper. The iterative linear optimization based algorithms will solve the constrained
group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) in the setting where f, g are convex, Lipschitz
functions with Lipschitz gradients. The exponential sampling algorithm will only require Lipschitz
continuity.
For the iterative algorithms we will present, we assume that C is closed under randomization.
That is, for every c1, . . . , cT ∈ C, if c ∈ ∆({ci}Ti=1) then c ∈ C. Furthermore, the loss of c will be
the weighted average of the losses of the decisions c1, . . . , cT . For any i ∈ [T ], c will predict ci(x)
with probability wi where
∑T
i=1wi = 1. We also assume that we can return randomized decisions
defined over ∆(C).
Having settled on a reductionist optimization problem (Definition 1.1), the goal will be to obtain
a decision cˆ ∈ C for which
E[f(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ f(`(c∗, S)) + α, E[g(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ α
OR w.p. ≥ 1− ρ, ρ ∈ (0, 1)
f(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ f(`(c∗, S)) + α, g(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ α (3)
where f, g : [0, 1]K → R are functions for which c∗ ∈ argminc∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0 f(`(c, S)) + α is the best
decision (according to f(·)) that satisfies the constraint function g(·) and S is a fixed dataset of
size n 11. The expectation or the high probability bound is over the random coins of the algorithm
that chooses cˆ.
To reach the guarantee in Equation (3), we rely on the following key lemma and corollary which
results in a weighted private gradients optimization strategy when the additional constraint of
11For any α1, α2 > 0 where α1 6= α2, we can always obtain E[f(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ α1 and E[g(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ α2 by optimizing
both functions to within α = min{α1, α2} instead.
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privacy is added in the case of the first-order algorithms. For this strategy, we essentially optimize
two functions simultaneously while ensuring privacy by weighting the gradients of the functions f
and g. As a consequence, the standard deviation of the noise distribution used to ensure privacy
will also scale with the weights applied to the gradients of f and g.
Lemma 4.1. For any Lipschitz continuous functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R, suppose that there exists
y ∈ [0, 1]K such that g(y) ≤ 0.
For any G > 0, define the function h : [0, 1]K → R as follows: h(x) = f(x)+G ·max(0, g(x)) for
any x ∈ [0, 1]K . Then for all x′ ∈ [0, 1]K such that h(x′) ≤ minx∈[0,1]K h(x) + α, we are guaranteed
that
f(x′) ≤ min
x∈[0,1]K :g(x)≤0
f(x) + α, g(x′) ≤ α+ Lf
√
K
G
where Lf is the Lipschitz constant for the function f .
Proof. Let α > 0 and G > 0. Then for all x′ ∈ [0, 1]K such that h(x′) ≤ minx∈[0,1]K h(x) + α,
h(x′) = f(x′) +G ·max(0, g(x′)) ≤ min
x∈[0,1]K :g(x)≤0
f(x) + α
implies that
1. f(x′) ≤ minx∈[0,1]K :g(x)≤0 f(x) + α;
2. g(x′) ≤ α+Lf
√
K
G since by the definition of Lipschitz constants we have maxx,x′∈[0,1]K f(x) −
f(x′) ≤ Lf‖x− x′‖ ≤ Lf
√
K since x, x′ ∈ [0, 1]K by definition.
Corollary 4.2. Define h(x) = f(x) +
α+Lf
√
K
α max(0, g(x)) for all x ∈ [0, 1]K . Then for any
x′ ∈ [0, 1]K , α > 0 such that h(x′) ≤ minx∈[0,1]K h(x) + α, we are guaranteed that
f(x′) ≤ min
x∈[0,1]K :g(x)≤0
f(x) + α, g(x′) ≤ α.
Proof. The corollary follows from Lemma 4.1 by setting G =
α+Lf
√
K
α .
Since f, g are Lipschitz continuous and for all c ∈ C and datasets S of size n, `(c, S) ∈ [0, 1]K
(by Definition), we know that using Corollary 4.2 we can achieve Equation (3). This will be key
to our constrained group-objective optimization algorithms both in the privacy-preserving and the
non-privacy-preserving cases.
We will go on to show a linear optimization based algorithm to achieve the guarantee in Equa-
tion (3) both with and without privacy guarantees. But first we will present an exponential sampling
(, 0) differentially private algorithm that directly applies Lemma 4.1.
5 Algorithms for Private Constrained Group-Objective Optimiza-
tion
We present algorithms to solve the constrained group-objective optimization problem CGOO(n,K, f, g, `, S, α).
To simplify analysis and notation, we assume that both functions f and g are 1-Lipschitz func-
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tions (i.e. their Lipschitz constants are Lf = Lg = 1). For general Lf -Lipschitz function f and
Lg-Lipschitz function g, we can run the algorithms on f/Lf and g/Lg with accuracy parameter
α/max{Lf , Lg}.
In this section, our goal is to use an algorithmic approach to privately obtain a decision cˆ ∈ C
satisfying the guarantee given in Equation 3. The privacy and utility guarantees will be in terms
of a high probability bound rather than in expectation. The randomness will be taken over the
random coins of the algorithm. We will go on to analyze the effects of imposing the additional
constraint of (, 0) or (, δ) differential privacy in the computation of the decision c˜ ∈ C that will be
returned by the empirical risk minimization algorithms. We will present upper and lower bounds
for the oracle complexity of solving the problem.
For the iterative algorithms, we assume that we have oracle access to the convex, β-smooth
functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R and their corresponding gradient oracles ∇f,∇g : [0, 1]K → RK and
upper bound the oracle complexity of obtaining c˜ ∈ C in a privacy-preserving manner. We note
that even if f and g are not convex and smooth, there exists techniques for smoothing the functions
(e.g. Manning et al. [2008]).
Key to the definition of differential privacy is a notion of adjacency (or neighboring) of datasets
i.e. datasets that differ in one row. Let S, S′ be neighboring datasets (differing in one row) of size
n. We will use the relation between S, S′ to obtain better noise parameters to ensure differential
privacy. Samples from the Laplace, Exponential, or Normal distribution are often used to perturb
the output of a function (or gradient of a function) to ensure privacy. The standard deviation
of the noise distribution from which the samples are drawn will decrease as n → ∞. Suppose
that βf , βg are the smoothness parameters of the functions f and g and Lf , Lg are the Lipschitz
constants of f and g, then for any setting of G > 0, we can define the function h : [0, 1]K → R as
follows: h(`(c, S)) = f(`(c, S)) +G ·max(0, g(`(c, S))). Then for any neighboring datasets S, S′, by
Lemma 5.1, we can bound ‖∇h(`(c, S)) − ∇h(`(c, S′))‖ and |h(`(c, S)) − h(`(c, S′))|. We will use
these bounds for the global sensitivities of the functions we will optimize in a differentially private
way.
Lemma 5.1. Let Lf , Lg be the Lipschitz constants of the functions f : [0, 1]
K → R and g : [0, 1]K →
R respectively. And let βf , βg be the Lipschitz constants of their gradients ∇f,∇g respectively.
Then for any setting of G > 0, define h(`(c, S)) = f(`(c, S)) +G ·max(0, g(`(c, S))). Then for any
neighboring datasets S, S′ we have ‖∇h(`(c, S))−∇h(`(c, S′))‖ ≤ (βf +G ·βg)
√
K
n and |h(`(c, S))−
h(`(c, S′))| ≤ (Lf +G · Lg)
√
K
n .
Proof. We proceed to use the definitions of f, g and `. Also, recall that we defined `(c, S) as an
average of losses over S i.e. `(c, S) = 1n
∑n
i=1 `(c, Si). Then
‖∇h(`(c, S))−∇h(`(c, S′))‖ ≤ (βf +G · βg)‖`(c, S)− `(c, S′)‖ ≤ (βf +G · βg)
√
K
n
,
and
|h(`(c, S))− h(`(c, S′))| ≤ (Lf +G · Lg)‖`(c, S)− `(c, S′)‖ ≤ (Lf +G · Lg)
√
K
n
.
Now we go on to present procedures to obtain a decision c˜ ∈ C that solves the constrained
group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1) with and without privacy. Along with the
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algorithms, we will present oracle complexity upper bounds for these procedures.
5.1 Exponential Sampling
Without the use of an optimization oracle (for a specific implementation of the exponential mech-
anism), the following is a generic exponential mechanism to solve the constrained group-objective
convex optimization problem with privacy. This method assumes we have an oracle to sample from
the set `(C, S) – assumed to be convex – with a certain probability.
Algorithm 1: Exponential Sampling for Constrained Group-Objective Optimization.
Input: `, f, g, S ∈ (X × Y)n, G
1
2 Set h(`(c, S)) = f(`(c, S)) +G ·max(0, g(`(c, S)))
3 Sample `(c˜, S) with probability ∝ exp
(
·n·h(`(c,S))
2
√
K(1+G)
)
4 return c˜
Theorem 5.2. Suppose we are given 1-Lipschitz functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R, loss function ` :
C × (X × Y)n → [0, 1]K , and privacy parameter  > 0. Then there exists n0 = O
(
K2
α2
)
such that
for all n ≥ n0 and privacy parameter  > 0 if we set G = O(
√
K
α ), Algorithm 1 is an  differentially
private algorithm that, with probability at least 9/10, returns a decision c˜ ∈ C with the following
guarantee:
f(`(c˜, S)) ≤ f(`(c∗, S)) + α, g(`(c˜, S)) ≤ α,
where c∗ ∈ argminc∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0 f(`(c, S)) is the best decision in the feasible set C, given dataset
S of size n, and assuming that the set `(C, S) is a convex set.
Proof. The proof of privacy follows from a direct application of the Exponential Mechanism (see
Theorem 3.7) with loss function
− (f(`(c, S)) +G ·max(0, g(`(c, S)))) .
since the sensitivity of this function is at most
√
K(1+G)
n by Lemma 5.1.
If we naively applied the exponential mechanism utility analysis, we will get a dependence on
the size of either C (the decision set) or `(C, S). In order to avoid this we will rely on a “peeling”
argument of convex optimization already analyzed by Bassily et al. [2014]. Even though their results
are written in expectation, we use the high probability version which gives that with probability at
least 9/10,
h(`(c˜, S))− h(`(c∗, S)) = O
(
K
√
K(1 +G)
n
)
by Theorem 3.2 in [Bassily et al., 2014] 12. Now since G = O(
√
K
α ) we have that there exists
no = O
(
K2
α2
)
such that for all n ≥ n0, we can apply Corollary 4.2 to obtain the guarantees stated
12Note that we use another version of their theorem (given with high probability) rather than the original statement
given in expectation. The end of Theorem 3.2 in [Bassily et al., 2014] gives an excess risk bound with high probability.
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in the theorem.
In later sections, we will show that the sample complexity to solve constrained group objective
optimization is lower-bounded by n = Ω
(
K
α
)
for (pure)  differential privacy. As a result, there is
a multiplicative gap of O(Kα ) between the upper bound and lower bound. An open problem is to
close this gap.
5.2 Linear Optimization Based Algorithm without Privacy
In this section, we essentially achieve the same guarantees as in [Alabi et al., 2018] when f, g are
both convex and Lipschitz-continuous (see Observation 6 of that paper). We note that the main
theorem in this section is stated and derived in a more general way than [Alabi et al., 2018] so that
privacy constraints can be more readily added to the formulation.
As in [Alabi et al., 2018], we assume the existence of an approximate linear optimizer oracle
solver LOPT. We will translate LOPT with additive error τ into a β-multiplicative approximation
algorithm and then apply Theorem 5.5. First, we define the LOPT oracle and then use it to solve
the constrained group-objective optimization problem.
Definition 5.3 (LOPT). LOPT is an oracle for solving linear subproblems approximately. As-
suming that W is a set of weight vectors, then for any weight vector w ∈ W, if c˜ = LOPT(C, w, S)
then
w · `(c˜, S) ≤ min
c∈C
w · `(c, S) + τ‖w‖.
where C is the decision set, S is the dataset, and τ is the tolerance parameter of the oracle.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose we are given convex 1-Lipschitz-continuous functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R,
loss function ` : C × (X × Y)n → [0, 1]K . Then assuming we have access to an approximate linear
optimizer oracle LOPT (Definition 5.3), after T = O
(
K4
α2
)
calls to LOPT, with probability at least
9/10, we will obtain a decision cˆ ∈ C with the following guarantee:
f(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ f(`(c∗, S)) + α, g(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ α,
for any α ∈ (0, 1] where c∗ ∈ argminc∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0 f(`(c, S)) is the best decision in the feasible
set C, given dataset S of size n such that `(C, S) ⊂ [0, 1]K is compact.
Proof. Given the functions f, g, we can define the “new” function h(`(c, S)) = f(`(c, S)) + G ·
max(0, g(`(c, S))) for any c ∈ C and dataset S of size n. Since f, g are 1-Lipschitz and convex we
know that ‖∇f(`(c, S))‖, ‖∇g(`(c, S))‖ ≤ 1, which implies that ‖∇h(`(c, S))‖ ≤ 1 +G for all c, S.
Now we proceed to do some setup in order to apply Theorem 5.5. Let W = {23}×
[− 13K , 13K ]K .
Note that ‖w‖ ≤ 1 for all w ∈ W. Define Φ(c, S) = (1, `(c, S)) so that ‖Φ(c, S)‖ ≤ √1 +K and
Φ(c, S) · w ≤ 1 for all c ∈ C and datasets S. As required by Kakade et al. [2009], we assume that
`(C, S) is compact so that Φ(C, S) is also compact.
We have to convert the approximate linear optimizer oracle into a β-approximation algorithm
A :W → C. Define A(w) = A(2/3, w′) = LOPT(C, w, S) where w′ ∈ RK are the last K coordinates
of w ∈ W. Now we use that Φ(c, S) · w = 23 + `(c, S) · w′ ≥ 13 for any w ∈ W to conclude that for
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any dataset S,
Φ(A(w), S) · w ≤ min
c∈C
(
2
3
+ `(c, S) · w′
)
+ τ‖w′‖ ≤ (1 + 3τ‖w′‖)
(
2
3
+ `(c, S) · w′
)
.
And note that since ‖w′‖ ≤ 1/3, A is a β approximation algorithm where β = 1 + τ .
Now we can apply Algorithm 3.1 of Kakade et al. [2009] to the following sequence: w1 =
(13 , 0, . . . , 0), wt+1 = (
2
3 ,
∇h(`(ct,S))
3K(1+G) ) where ct is the decision output in the tth iteration of Algorithm
3.1 in [Kakade et al., 2009]. In iteration 1, c1 is chosen arbitrarily. Note that for all t ∈ [T ], wt ∈ W.
Then we output cˆ = Unif({c1, . . . , cT }). If c∗ is the best decision in C, by Theorem 5.5 we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
Φ(ct, S) · wt ≤ (β + 2)
√
1 +K
T
+ β
1
T
T∑
t=1
Φ(c∗, S) · wt.
And since 1T
∑T
t=1 Φ(c
∗, S) · wt ≤ 1 and (1 +K)/T ≤ 1 we have that
1
T
T∑
t=1
(Φ(ct, S)− Φ(c∗, S)) · wt ≤ (β + 2)
√
1 +K
T
+ β − 1 = (3 + τ)
√
1 +K
T
+ τ.
Then by the convexity of f and the definitions of Φ and wt we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
(Φ(ct, S)− Φ(c∗, S)) · wt = 1
3K(1 +G)T
T∑
t=1
(`(ct, S)− `(c∗, S)) · ∇h(`(ct, S)) (4)
≥ 1
3K(1 +G)T
T∑
t=1
h(`(ct, S))− h(`(c∗, S)) (5)
so that for τ = α/2 and T ≥ 9(6+α)2K2(1+K)(1+G)2
α2
we have
E[h(`(cˆ, S))]− h(`(c∗, S)) ≤ 3K(1 +G)
(
(3 + τ)
√
1 +K
T
+ τ
)
≤ α.
By Markov’s inequality we have that with probability at least 9/10, h(`(cˆ, S))−h(`(c∗, S)) ≤ α
after T = O(K3(1 +G)2) iterations. Then by Corollary 4.2, we can set G = α+
√
K
α and obtain that
after T = O
(
K4
α2
)
iterations, f(`(cˆ, S))− f(`(c∗, S)) ≤ α and g(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ α.
Theorem 5.5 (Theorem 3.2 in Kakade et al. [2009]). Consider an K-dimensional online linear
optimization problem with feasible set C and mapping Φ : C × (X × Y)n → RK . Let A be an β-
approximation algorithm and take R,W ≥ 0 such that ‖Φ(A(w), S)‖ ≤ R and ‖w‖ ≤ W for all
w ∈ W.
For any w1, w2, . . . , wT ∈ W and any T ≥ 1 with learning parameter (β+1)RW√T , approximate projec-
tion tolerance parameter (β+1)R
2
T , and learning rate parameter
(β+1)
4(β+2)2T
, Algorithm 3.1 in [Kakade
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et al., 2009] achieves expected β-regret of at most
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
c(st, wt)
]
− βmin
s∈C
1
T
T∑
t=1
c(s, wt) ≤ (α+ 2)RW√
T
.
where c : C ×W → [0, 1] is the cost function.
To use Theorem 5.5 to minimize any convex function h : [0, 1]K → R with ‖∇h(`(c, S))‖ ≤
(1 +G) (for all c ∈ C and dataset S), we will set Φ(c, S) = (1, `(c, S)) and W = {23}×
[− 13K , 13K ]K
where in each iteration t ≥ 2, ct will be chosen by Algorithm 3.1 in [Kakade et al., 2009] and wt
will be (23 ,
∇h(`(c,S))
3K(1+G) ).
5.3 Linear Optimization Based Algorithm with Privacy
In this section we show that there exists an (, δ) differentially private algorithm for the constrained
group-objective optimization problem. Given a large-enough sample of size n, this algorithm will
produce empirical risk bounds that go to 0 as n→∞.
In the previous section, we assumed access to an approximate linear optimization oracle to
incrementally solve our overall convex problem. Inspired by this approach, we will first assume
access to a differentially private version of this oracle LOPTδ
13 and subsequently provide an
implementation of this private oracle based on its non-private counterpart.
We now define LOPTδ and its properties.
Definition 5.6 (LOPTδ). LOPT

δ is a differentially private oracle for solving linear subproblems
approximately. Assuming that W is a set of weight vectors then for any weight vector w ∈ W, if
c˜ = LOPTδ(C, w, S) then:
1. w · `(c˜, S) ≤ minc∈C w · `(c, S) + τ‖w‖
2. ∀c ∈ C, P[c˜ = c;S] ≤ eP[c˜ = c;S′] + δ
where the dataset S′ is a neighboring dataset of S and τ is the tolerance parameter of the oracle
that could depend on the privacy parameter  ≥ 0 and the size of the dataset S.
Algorithm 2 is a differentially private algorithm for solving the constrained group-objective
optimization problem by replacing the non-private linear optimizer oracle in Algorithm 4 with a
private version.
Lemma 5.7. For privacy parameters , δ ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 2 is (, δ) differentially private.
Proof. The proof of privacy follows from the advanced composition result (see Lemma A.6) since
we set ′ = 
2
√
2T log(1/δ′)
where δ′ = δ2T . Then since in each iteration t ∈ [T ] we satisfy (′, δ′)
differential privacy, we must have that the overall algorithm is (, δ) differentially private.
13For the private algorithms provided in [Jagielski et al., 2018], a differentially private cost-sensitive classification
oracle is assumed.
17
Algorithm 2: (, δ)-private algorithm using LOPT
′
δ′ oracle.
Input: LOPTδ, T, `,∇f,∇g, S ∈ (X × Y)n, G
1
2 Arbitrarily select decision c ∈ C as c˜1
3
4 for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 do
5 δ′ = δ2T , 
′ = 
2
√
2T log(1/δ′)
6 rt(c˜t, S) = ∇f(`(c˜t, S)) +G · 1[g(`(c˜t, S)) ≥ 0] · ∇g(`(c˜t, S))
7 c˜t+1 = LOPT
′
δ′ (C, rt(c˜t, S), S)
8
9 return c˜ = Unif({c˜1, . . . , c˜T })
Algorithm 2 is an oracle-efficient algorithm. The utility guarantee of this algorithm is not
analyzed here since it depends on the implementation of this private linear optimization oracle.
We now proceed to provide a specific implementation of this oracle with corresponding proofs for
privacy and utility.
Theorem 5.8. Suppose we are given convex 1-Lipschitz-continuous functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R
and loss function ` : C × (X × Y)n → [0, 1]K . Let f, g have smoothness parameters βf , βg where
max{βf , βg} ≤ 1. Then there exists n0 = O˜
(
K3
α
)
such that for all n ≥ n0, given access to an
approximate linear optimizer oracle LOPT (Definition 5.3), after T = O( 
2n2
K2
) calls to LOPT, with
probability at least 9/10, we will obtain a decision c˜ ∈ C with the following guarantee:
f(`(c˜, S)) ≤ f(`(c∗, S)) + α, g(`(c˜, S)) ≤ α,
for any α ∈ (0, 1] and privacy parameters  ∈ (0, 1], δ ∈ (0, 120 ] where c∗ ∈ argminc∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0 f(`(c, S))
is the best decision in the feasible set C, given dataset S of size n such that `(C, S) ⊂ [0, 1]K is
compact.
Proof. First, we show that the means for obtaining c˜ = Unif({c˜1, . . . , c˜T }) satisfies (, δ) differential
privacy. This result follows by Lemma 5.7, assuming the existence of the LOPT
′
δ′ oracle. What
remains is to show an implementation of the oracle LOPT
′
δ′ that satsifies (
′, δ′) differential privacy
for ′ = 
2
√
2T log(1/δ′)
, δ′ = δ2T . It might be instructive for the reader to read the implementation
of LOPT in Theorem 5.4 to follow the non-private analogues of Φ and W (both used to implement
the approximate linear optimizer LOPT).
As done previously, we define the following function h(`(c, S)) = f(`(c, S))+G·max(0, g(`(c, S)))
for any c ∈ C and dataset S. `(c, S) is the loss of decision c on S. Previously, we defined Φ(c) =
(1 + `(c, S)) and wt = (
2
3 ,
∇h(`(ct,S))
3K(1+G) ) at time step t ∈ [T ]. Now we set Φ(c, S) = (1, `(c, S) +
X) where X ∼ N (0, σ211K×K), σ1 = 2
√
K
n′
√
2 log 4/δ′ and wt = (23 ,
∇h(`(ct,S))+X
6K(1+G) ) where X ∼
N (0, σ221K×K), σ2 = 2(βf+Gβg)
√
K
n′
√
2 log 4/δ′ + ′. By the guarantees of the Gaussian Mechanism
(Theorem 3.8), Φ(c, S) satisfies (′/2, δ′/2) differential privacy and by Lemma 5.9, wt satisfies
(′/2, δ′/2) differential privacy.
We have shown a construction of LOPT
′
δ′ (satisfying (
′, δ′) differential privacy in each iteration
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t ∈ [T ]. As a result, c˜ = Unif({c˜1, . . . , c˜T }) is computed in an (, δ) differentially private way, thus
completing our proof of privacy. We proceed to show our utility guarantees.
By the union bound, with probability ≥ 1− δ/2, for all iterations 1, . . . , T we have ‖Φ(c, S)‖ ≤√
1 + 4K if n > 4
√
K
′ log
4KT
δ′ . Also, since max{βf , βg} ≤ 1 as long as n ≥ 8 max{βf , βg}
√
K

(
log 8KTδ′
)
we have that in all iterations ‖wt‖ ≤ 1 with probability ≥ 1− δ/2. Then the analysis can proceed
like in the non-private version (see Theorem 5.4) and get that after T = O(K
4
α2
iterations, with
probability at least .95, our excess risk becomes ≤ α. But note that we need the dataset to be
n > 3K′ log
4KT
δ′ =
16K

√
2T log 2T/δ log 8KT
2
δ because of advanced composition. As a result, we
get that T must be at most O˜
(
2n2
K2
)
which implies that the sample complexity is O˜
(
K3
α
)
. And
since δ ≤ 120 , we get that the theorem statement holds with probability at least 9/10.
Lemma 5.9. Suppose we are given 1-Lipschitz functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R, loss function ` :
C × (X × Y)n → [0, 1]K , privacy parameters ′, δ′ ∈ (0, 1] and any G > 0 and we then construct
h(`(ct, S)) = f(`(ct, S)) +G ·max(0, g(`(ct, S))) for any ct chosen in iteration t ∈ [T ].
Then if f, g have smoothness parameters βf , βg respectively then releasing ∇h(`(ct, S))+X,X ∼
N (0, σ221K×K), σ2 = (βf+Gβg)
√
K
n′
√
2 log 2/δ′ + 2′ satisfies (′, δ′) differential privacy.
Proof. Let S, S′ be neighboring datasets and for all c ∈ C we denote P[c˜t = c;S],P[c˜t = c;S′] as the
probability of observing the event {ct = c} for the datasets S, S′ respectively. Then the goal is to
show that for all c ∈ C,
e−
′
(P(c˜t = c;S′)− δ′) ≤ P(c˜t = c;S) ≤ e′(P(c˜t = c;S′) + δ′).
Let µ(·, S), µ(·, S′) be the density of the distribution when the datasets S, S′ are used to compute
the loss. Then intuitively for any c˜t ∈ C, we want ∇h(c˜t, S) + at to be very close to ∇h(c˜t, S′) + a′t
where at, a
′
t are gaussian noise vectors drawn from the same distribution. Stated more formally, for
every output v, we want the density of the output distribution to be the same (with probability
1− δ) under S and S′ up to a factor of exp().
To make this happen, for any c ∈ C, let Γ = ∇h(c, S′)−∇h(c, S). Then assuming a′t = at − Γ
µ(y;S′)
µ(y;S)
=
µ(a′t = y − rt(c, S′);S′)
µ(at = y − rt(c, S);S) (6)
=
e−
‖a′t‖22
2σ2
e−
‖at‖22
2σ2
(7)
= e
1
2σ2
(‖at‖22−‖a′t‖22) (8)
= e
1
2σ2
(‖at‖22−‖at−Γ‖22) (9)
= e
1
2σ2
(2〈at,Γ〉−‖Γ‖22) (10)
Now we know that ‖Γ‖ ≤ (βf +Gβg)
√
K
n by Lemma 5.1.
Using Lemmas A.1 and A.2, we get that for any s > 1,
P[|〈at,Γ〉| ≥ (βf +Gβg)
√
K
n
σs] ≤ 2e− s
2
2 .
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Now define V¯ to be the set {a ∈ RK : |〈a,Γ〉| ≥ (βf + Gβg)
√
K
n σs}. Then we want at to be in
V w.p. ≥ 1 − δ′. We can set s =
√
2 log 2δ′ to get 2e
− s2
2 = δ′. Then Line 10 results in an upper
bound of e
1
2σ2
(σ(βf+Gβg)
√
K
n
√
8 log 2
δ′+((βf+Gβg)
√
K
n
)2)
and to get the absolute of the logarithm of this
term to be ≤ ′ we need
σ ≥ (βf +Gβg)
√
K
n′
(√
2 log
2
δ′
+ 2′
)
.
and replacing ′ with 
2
√
2T log(1/δ′)
and δ′ = δ2T we get
σ ≥ (βf +Gβg)
√
K
n
√
8T log
2T
δ
√√√√2 log 4T
δ
+
2√
8T log 2Tδ
 .
Then we have
P(c˜t = c;S) = P[at ∈ V ]P(c˜t = c|at ∈ V ;S) + P[at ∈ V¯ ]P(c˜t = c|at ∈ V¯ ;S) (11)
≤ P[at ∈ V ]P(c˜t = c|at ∈ V ;S) + δ′ (12)
≤ e′P[at ∈ V ]P(c˜t = c|at ∈ V ;S′) + δ′ (13)
= e
′
P(c˜t = c;S′) + δ′ (14)
thus showing (′, δ′) differential privacy.
In later sections, we will show that the sample complexity to solve constrained group objective
optimization is lower-bounded by n = Ω
(√
K
α
)
for (approximate) (, δ) differential privacy. As a
result, there is a multiplicative gap of O(K2
√
K) between the upper bound and lower bound. An
open problem is to close this gap.
6 Information-Theoretic Lower Bounds for Constrained Group-
Objective Optimization
We now proceed to show excess risk lower bounds for private constrained group-objective optimiza-
tion.
We ask: over the randomness of any (, 0) or (, δ) differentially private mechanism, for a
fixed dataset S of size n, what is a lower bound for the accuracy of the mechanism that solves the
constrained group-objective optimization problem?
We show a lower bound on the excess risk that is agnostic of the representation of the decision
cˆ ∈ C but for which `(C) = BK2 = {l ∈ RK≥0 : ‖l‖2 = 1} ⊂ [0, 1]K . That is, we consider the
case where the loss vectors for all decisions and datasets lie in the unit ball with `2 norm. i.e.
`(c, S) ∈ BK2 for all c ∈ C and datasets S of size n. We show that for all n,K ∈ N and  > 0 there
exists a dataset S = {xi}ni=1 ⊆ BK2 for which there is a constrained group-objective optimization
problem with functions f, g such that both f and g will both have excess risk lower bounds of
α ≥ Ω(Kn) and α ≥ Ω(
√
K
n ) for any , (, δ) differentially private algorithms respectively.
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6.1 (, 0) Lower Bound
Theorem 6.1. Let n,K ∈ N and  > 0. For every  differentially private algorithm M that
produces a decision cˆ ∈ C such that
f(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ min
c∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0
f(`(c, S)) + α, g(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ α
there is a dataset S = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ BK2 such that, with probability at least 1/2, we must have
α ≥ Ω (Kn) where `(cˆ, S) ∈ BK2 for all datasets S of size n and f, g are 1-Lipschitz, smooth functions
defined as follows:
f(l) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
〈l, xi〉, g(l) = f(l) + 1
n
‖
n∑
i=1
xi‖.
for all l ∈ BK2 .
Proof. The major idea in the proof is to reduce to the problem of optimizing 1-way marginals (a
standard method for lower bounding the accuracy of differentially private mechanisms).
We have defined f as f(l) = − 1n
∑n
i=1〈l, xi〉 which has minimum l∗ =
∑n
i=1 xi
‖∑ni=1 xi‖ by Lemma 6.3.
We defined g as g(l) = f(l)+ 1n‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖ = f(l)−f(l∗) which has minimum l∗ so that the constraint
g(l∗) ≤ 0 is satisfied.
Now by Lemma 6.4, we have that f(l)− f(l∗) = ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖
2n ‖l− l∗‖2. Now we invoke Lemma 6.5.
If lˆ is the output of any  differentially private mechanismM then we must have that ‖l− l∗‖ =
Ω(1). Suppose not. Then that would imply that we can construct a new mechanism M′ that
outputs lˆ · ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖
n which would contradict Lemma 6.5. As a result, ‖l − l∗‖ = Ω(1) so that
f(lˆ)− f(l∗) = Ω(Kn) for the output lˆ of any  differentially private mechanism.
6.2 (, δ) Lower Bound
Theorem 6.2. Let n,K ∈ N,  > 0, and δ = o( 1n). For every (, δ) differentially private algorithm
M that produces a decision cˆ ∈ C such that
f(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ min
c∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0
f(`(c, S)) + α, g(`(cˆ, S)) ≤ α
there is a dataset S = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ BK2 such that, with probability at least 1/3, we must have
α ≥ Ω
(√
K
n
)
where `(cˆ, S) ∈ BK2 for all datasets S of size n and f, g are 1-Lipschitz, smooth
functions defined as follows:
f(l) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
〈l, xi〉, g(l) = f(l) + 1
n
‖
n∑
i=1
xi‖.
for all l ∈ BK2 .
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6.3 Helper Lemmas
Lemma 6.3. Let l∗ = argminl:‖l‖≥1− 1n
∑n
i=1〈l, xi〉 where xi ∈ BK2 for all i ∈ [n], then l∗ =∑n
i=1 xi
‖∑ni=1 xi‖ .
Proof. Note that for any l ∈ BK2 we have |〈l,
∑n
i=1 xi〉| ≤ ‖l‖‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖ = ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖ by Cauchy-
Schwarz and this is tight when l =
∑n
i=1 xi
‖∑ni=1 xi‖ or l = −
∑n
i=1 xi
‖∑ni=1 xi‖ . As a result, The minimum of
− 1n
∑n
i=1〈l, xi〉 is attained at l =
∑n
i=1 xi
‖∑ni=1 xi‖ .
Lemma 6.4. Let f(l) = − 1n
∑n
i=1〈l, xi〉 where l, xi ∈ BK2 for all i ∈ [n], then
f(l)− f(l∗) = ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖
2n
‖l − l∗‖2
for any l ∈ BK2 and l∗ =
∑n
i=1 xi
‖∑ni=1 xi‖ .
Proof. We have that
f(l)− f(l∗) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(〈l∗, xi〉 − 〈l, xi〉) (15)
=
1
n
(
〈l∗,
n∑
i=1
xi〉 − 〈l,
n∑
i=1
xi〉
)
(16)
=
1
n
(
‖
n∑
i=1
xi‖ − 〈l,
n∑
i=1
xi〉
)
(17)
=
‖∑ni=1 xi‖
n
(1− 〈l, l∗〉) (18)
=
‖∑ni=1 xi‖
2n
‖l − l∗‖2 (19)
where we have used that ‖l − l∗‖2 = ‖l‖2 + ‖l∗‖2 − 2〈l, l∗〉 = 2− 2〈l, l∗〉 and l∗ =
∑n
i=1 xi
‖∑ni=1 xi‖ .
Proof. We follow the steps of the proof for Theorem 6.1 but invoke the lower bound for 1-way
marginals in the approximate differential privacy case (and not the pure case).
Again, the way we have defined f , by Lemma 6.4, we have that f(l)−f(l∗) = ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖
2n ‖l− l∗‖2.
Now we invoke Lemma 6.6.
If lˆ is the output of any (, δ) differentially private mechanism M then we must have that
‖l− l∗‖ = Ω(1). Suppose not. Then that would imply that we can construct a new mechanismM′
that outputs lˆ · ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖
n which would contradict Lemma 6.6. As a result, ‖l − l∗‖ = Ω(1) so that
f(lˆ)− f(l∗) = Ω(
√
K
n ) for the output lˆ of any (, δ) differentially private mechanism.
We now state lower bound lemmas for 1-way marginals. Lemma 6.5 shows the lower bound
for 1-way marginals for  differentially private algorithms and Lemma 6.6 is for (, δ) differentially
private algorithms.
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Lemma 6.5 (Part 1 of Lemma 5.1 in [Bassily et al., 2014]). Let n,K ∈ N and  > 0. There exists
a number M = Ω(min(n, K )) such that for every  differentially private algorithm M there is a
dataset S = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ BK2 with ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖2 ∈ [M − 1,M + 1] such that, with probability at
least 1/2 (over the randomness of the algorithm), we have
‖M(S)− q(S)‖2 = Ω(min(1, K
n
))
where q(S) = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi.
Lemma 6.6 (Part 2 of Lemma 5.1 in [Bassily et al., 2014]). Let n,K ∈ N,  > 0, and δ = o( 1n).
There is a number M = Ω(min(n,
√
K
 )) such that for every (, δ) differentially private algorithm
M, there is a dataset S = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ BK2 with ‖
∑n
i=1 xi‖2 ∈ [M − 1,M + 1] such that, with
probability at least 1/3 (over the randomness of the algorithm), we have
‖M(S)− q(S)‖2 = Ω(min(1,
√
K
n
))
where q(S) = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi.
7 Reductions Approach to Optimization and Learning
The reductions approach in machine learning [John Langford, Langford et al., 2006] has been widely
studied and applied in different scenarios. Applications to ranking, regression, classification, and
importance-weighted classification are particularly well-known. The crux of the reductions approach
to optimization and learning is to use the machinery – both theory and practice – of solutions to
one machine learning problem in order to solve another learning problem by reducing one problem
to another.
A concrete example of the use of the reductions approach is by Agarwal et al. [2018]. The
authors present a systematic approach to reduce the problem of fair classification to cost-sensitive
classification problems. We will first review applications of the reductions approach to optimization
and learning and then explain how to make this approach differentially private through the linear
optimization based algorithm presented in this paper.
Furthermore, we will focus on the problem of empirical risk minimization where we are given
a finite-sized training sample from an unknown distribution and will optimize with respect to this
finite sample. Generalization guarantees can be derived based on draws of a large enough sample
from the distribution (or knowledge of the complexity of the hypothesis class to be learned) and
knowledge of proportion of the population belonging to a specific subgroup 14. We do not focus on
generalization in this paper but rather on the problem of empirical risk minimization.
First, we discuss how the reductions approach can be applied to optimize convex measures of
the confusion matrix and then discuss how it can be applied to a few other definitions from the
algorithmic fairness literature.
14Which can also be estimated from a large enough sample drawn from the distribution.
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7.1 Convex Measures of Confusion Matrix
Definition 7.1 (Confusion Matrix). The confusion matrix (sometimes referred to as the contin-
gency table) Cµ[h] ∈ [0, 1]L×L of an hypothesis h with respect to a distribution µ over examples is
defined as
Cµpq[h] = C
µ
pq ◦ h = Px,y∼µ [y = p, h(x) = q]
We shall sometimes refer to Cµ[h] as C[h] or C. L is the number of possible labellings that h(x)
or y can be for any example (x, y) ∼ µ.
Our algorithms in this paper to solve the problem of constrained group-objective optimization
assume that our functions f and g are convex functions of the loss vectors. The performance
measures G-mean and H-mean are both convex functions of the confusion matrix [Narasimhan,
2018].
Example 7.2 (G-mean). The G-mean performance measure is used to measure the quality of both
multiclass and binary classifiers in settings of severe class imbalance. It is defined as
GMean(C) = 1−
(
L∏
i=1
Cii∑L
j=1Cij
)1/L
for some confusion matrix C = Cµ[h] defined on distribution µ and hypothesis h.
Example 7.3 (H-mean). The H-mean performance measure is defined as
HMean(C) = 1− L
(
L∑
i=1
∑L
j=1Cji
Cii
)−1
for some confusion matrix C = Cµ[h] defined on distribution µ and hypothesis h.
Since we do not have access to the true confusion matrix Cµ[h] which requires access to the
distribution µ itself – not just finite samples – we must rely on empirical estimates of CS [h] as
follows:
CˆSpq[h] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1 [yi = p, h(xi) = q]
where S ∼ µn is a finite sample of size n and h is an hypothesis. We term CˆS , the empirical
confusion matrix.
Note that the empirical confusion matrix CˆS [h] ∈ (0, 1]L×L can be written in terms of con-
strained group-objective optimization as follows. For a finite sample S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, we define
the loss vector `(h, S) ∈ (0, 1]K where K = L2 as
`k(h, S) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1[yi = p ∧ h(xi) = q], k = L · (p− 1) + q
for any k ∈ [L2] so that CˆSpq[h] can be mapped to the specific entry `k(h, S).
Note that the entries of CˆS are defined in terms of the 0-1 loss which is non-convex and thus
hard to optimize. As such, we could instead use a “smoothed” versions of this loss. For example,
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the hinge loss is a convex surrogate loss and the “smoothed” hinge loss is a convex and smooth
loss [Rennie and Srebro, 2005].
7.2 Algorithmic Fairness Definitions
In this section, we discuss how certain statistical definitions from the algorithmic fairness literature
can be written in terms of constrained group-objective optimization. The first two – equalized odds
and demographic parity – are used for ensuring some notion of fairness in classification and the
third – gini index of inequality – can be used for income analysis of inequality amongst subgroups
of a population.
For the first two definitions, the setup is as follows: The goal is to learn an accurate classifier
h : X → {0, 1} from some family of classifiers (e.g. decision trees, neural networks, or polynomial
threshold functions) while satisfying some definition of “fairness.” We assume that we are given
training examples S = {(xi, ai, yi)}ni=1 ∈ (X ,A,Y)n typically representing n individuals drawn i.i.d.
over the joint distribution (X,A, Y ) ∼ µ. For each i ∈ [n], xi ∈ X is the features of individual
i, ai ∈ A is the protected attribute of the individual (e.g. race or gender), yi ∈ Y is the label.
Using constrained group-Objective optimization, the chosen hypothesis h need not have access to
nor knowledge of the protected attribute A during testing or deployment.
Definition 7.4 (Equalized Odds [Hardt et al., 2016]). A classifier h satisfies Equalized Odds under
a distribution over (X,A, Y ) if h(X), its prediction, is conditionally independent of the protected
attribute A given the label Y .
In notation, we have that for all a ∈ A, yˆ ∈ Y, x ∈ X
P(x,a,y)∼µ [h(x) = yˆ|A = a, Y = y] = P [h(x) = yˆ|Y = y]
Definition 7.5 (Demographic Parity [Agarwal et al., 2018]). A classifier h satisfies Demographic
Parity under a distribution over (X,A, Y ) if h(X), its prediction, is statistically independent of the
protected attribute A.
In notation, we have that for all a ∈ A, yˆ ∈ Y
P(x,a,y)∼µ [h(x) = yˆ|A = a] = P [h(x) = yˆ]
For optimization purposes, we often cannot satisfy either equalized odds or demographic parity
exactly so we must instead pursue relaxations of equalized odds and demographic parity. For
example, Jagielski et al. [2018] pursue γ Equalized Odds which is defined in Definition 7.7, stated
in terms of false positives and false negatives of a hypothesis h.
Definition 7.6 (Gini Index of Inequality [Busa-Fekete et al., 2017]). Suppose there areK subgroups
in a population of individuals earning income. The Gini Index of Inequality is given by
I(l) =
∑
i,j |li − lj |
2n
∑
i li
∈ [0, 1]
where l ∈ [0, 1]K and li could represent the percentile average income of individuals in subgroup i.
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The Gini index is not convex but quasi-convex which means that its level sets are convex. For
any given θ ∈ [0, 1], I(l) ≤ θ is equivalent to∑
i,j
|li − lj | − 2nθ
∑
li ≤ 0
which is a convex constraint [Alabi et al., 2018].
Definition 7.6 makes no distributional assumptions on the loss vector l ∈ [0, 1]K .
Agarwal et al. [2018] show how to convert the empirical risk minimization problem for satisfying
either demographic parity or equalized odds into the following problem:
min
h∈∆
ˆerr(h) s.t. Mµˆ(h) ≤ cˆ (20)
where the matrix M ∈ R|K|×|J | and the vector cˆ ∈ R|K| specify linear constraints for the problem
and µˆ(h) ∈ R|J | is a vector of conditional moments taken over the the distribution on (X , A,Y).
To convert into the form of constrained group-Objective optimization, we set f(`(h, S)) = ˆerr(h)
and g(`(h, S)) = (Mµˆ(h)− cˆ) ·1 where 1 is the all-ones vector or g(`(h, S)) = maxi∈[K](Mµˆ(h)− cˆ)i.
We leave out details of how to convert the definition of Demographic Parity and Equalized Odds
into Equation 20 as this is already done in Section 2 (termed “Problem Formulation”) in [Agarwal
et al., 2018]. Last, for the Gini index of inequality, we can convert into constrained group-Objective
optimization by setting the constraint function g to g(l) =
∑
i,j |li − lj | − 2nθ
∑
li ≤ 0 for some
θ ∈ [0, 1] and setting f(l) = −∑i li for all l ∈ [0, 1]K .
We note here that K, the number of groups, is not a constant and could vary depending on the
context, application, and matters of intersectionality [Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018].
Definition 7.7 (α Smoothed Equalized Odds for Constrained Group-Objective Convex Optimiza-
tion). Given a dataset of examples S = {(xi, ai, yi)}ni=1 ∈ (X ,A,Y)n of size n, where yi ∈ {0, 1},
ai ∈ A for all i ∈ [n], a classifier c ∈ C satisfies α Equalized Odds if
max
a,a′∈A
{max(|FˆP a − FˆP a′ |, | ˆTP a − ˆTP a′ |)} ≤ α (21)
where FˆP a, ˆTP a are empirical estimates of FPa(c) = P(x,a,y)[c(x) = 1|A = a, y = 0], TPa(c) =
P(x,a,y)[c(x) = 1|A = a, y = 1] respectively on dataset S.
We say a classifier satisfies Smoothed Equalized Odds if Equation 21 is satisfied when the max-
imum and absolute functions in Equation 2 are replaced with smoothed versions 15.
Corollary 7.8. For any privacy parameters  ∈ (0, 1], δ ∈ (0, 120 ], suppose we have a dataset of
examples S = {(xi, ai, yi)}ni=1 of size n where xi ∈ X , yi ∈ {0, 1}, ai ∈ A, for all i ∈ [n]. Suppose
we can write the α smoothed equalized odds constraint (by Definition 7.7) and the empirical error
as 1-Lipschitz, 1-smooth functions such that there exists at least one choice c ∈ C that satisfies this
constraint.
Then there exists n0 = O˜
( |A|3
α
)
such that for all n ≥ n0, with probability at least 9/10, we can
obtain a decision c˜ ∈ C satisfying α smoothed equalized odds and that is within α away from the
most accurate classifier after T = O(n
22
|A|2 ) calls to an approximate linear optimizer oracle.
15For example, the smooth maximum function is a smooth approximation to the maximum function.
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Proof. For any classifier c ∈ C we set the loss vector of c on S to
`(c, S) = (`1(c, S), . . . , `K(c, S))
with K = 3|A| where
`1(c, S) = FˆP 1, . . . , `|A|(c, S) = FˆP |A|,
`|A|+1(c, S) = ˆTP 1, . . . , `2|A|(c, S) = ˆTP |A|,
and
`2|A|+1(c, S) = ˆFN1, . . . , `3|A|(c, S) = ˆFN |A|.
Then the empirical error of any classifier c ∈ C is f(`(c, S)) = ∑a∈A FˆP a + ˆFNa (the sum of
the false positives and false negatives) and the α equalized odds is enforced via
g(`(c, S)) = max
a,a′∈A
{max(|FˆP a − FˆP a′ |, | ˆTP a − ˆTP a′ |)} − α
so that g(`(c, S)) ≤ 0 for all classifiers c ∈ C that satisfy α Equalized Odds. We use a smoothed
version of g(`(c, S)) (i.e. replace the maximum and absolute functions in that equation with the
smooth approximations of those functions).
Now, assuming there exists at least one choice c ∈ C such that g(`(c, S)) ≤ 0, we can just
directly apply Theorem 5.8 to f, g to obtain the desired corollary.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the problem of private fair optimization via a reductions approach to
the problem of private constrained group-objective optimization. We provided an (, 0) differentially
private exponential sampling algorithm and an (, δ) differentially private linear optimization based
algorithm as a solution. We also provide a lower bound on the excess risk for any  or (, δ)
differentially private algorithm that solves the constrained group-objective optimization problem.
We showed applications to optimizing complex performance measures of the confusion matrix (such
as G-mean and H-mean) and to satisfying definitions of algorithmic fairness (such as equalized odds,
demographic parity, and the gini index of inequality).
Our results show how to optimize with respect to convex functions. We defer to future work
the problem of constrained group-objective optimization with respect to non-convex objectives and
constraints. Abadi et al. [2016] consider differentially private algorithms for non-convex objectives
that we could draw inspiration from.
We hedge our results that have applications to algorithmic fairness: our results are theoretical
guarantees and we hope that practitioners (for example, companies and organizations) will use our
results to achieve desired outcomes.
Finally, we have presented differentially private empirical risk minimization algorithms
and have yet to derive generalization guarantees which could be interesting work for the future.
Specifically, differentially private algorithms are known to exhibit stability properties which imply
generalization [Dwork et al., 2015]. Analyzing the stability properties of the private algorithms
presented in this paper is interesting future work.
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A Some Tail Bounds, Inequalities, and Advanced Composition
Result
Lemma A.1. Let Z ∼ N (0, IK×K). Then for any (fixed) vector v ∈ RK ,
〈Z, v〉 ∼ N (0, ‖v‖22)
Lemma A.2. Let Z ∼ N (0, 1). Then for any t > 1,
P[|Z| > t] ≤ 2e−t2/2
Lemma A.3 (Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality). For any two vectors u, v of an inner product space we
have that
|〈u, v〉| ≤ ‖u‖‖v‖
Lemma A.4 (Jensen’s Inequality). For any t ∈ [0, 1] and convex function f : X → R, the following
holds:
f(tx1 + (1− t)x2) ≤ tf(x1) + (1− t)f(x2)
for any x1, x2 ∈ X
Lemma A.5 (Exponential Tail Bound). Let Z ∼ Exp(b) be a sample from the Exponential distri-
bution with scale parameter b > 0. Then
P [Z > t] = exp(− t
b
)
Lemma A.6 (Advanced Composition (Dwork and Roth [2014])). For all , δ, δ¯ ≥ 0, the class of
(, δ)-differentially private mechanisms results in (¯, kδ+δ¯)-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive
composition for:
¯ = 
√
2k log(1/δ¯) + k(e − 1)
A corollary of Lemma A.6 states that we can set  = ¯
2
√
2k log(1/δ¯)
to ensure (¯, kδ+ δ¯) differential
privacy overall for target privacy parameters ¯ ∈ (0, 1), δ¯ ∈ (0, 1].
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B Projection-Free Convex Optimization using Frank-Wolfe
In previous sections, we presented linear optimization based algorithms to solve the constrained
group-objective optimization problem with and without privacy. In this section, we present another
linear optimization based algorithm that is an adaptation of the Frank-Wolfe projection-free algo-
rithm. Algorithm 3 is the Frank-Wolfe algorithm presented in [Jaggi, 2013] which allows for use
of approximate linear optimizers to solve the subproblems in each iteration k ∈ [K]. The original
version of Frank-Wolfe only allowed for exact linear optimizers.
Lemma B.2 presents the convergence guarantees of the algorithm after k iterations in terms of
the curvature constant of the function h : Rn → R to be optimized (see Definition B.1) and the
accuracy of the linear optimizer oracle. We will rely on a modified version of Algorithm 3 to solve
the constrained group-objective optimization problem (Definition 1.1).
The execution of Algorithm 3 in each iteration relies on the availability of an approximate linear
oracle of the form minsˆ∈X 〈sˆ,∇h(x(k))〉. In [Alabi et al., 2018], the authors provide an algorithm
that can optimize any Lipschitz-continuous function h : Rn → R using an approximate linear
optimizer as an oracle solver.
Algorithm 3: Frank-Wolfe algorithm in [Jaggi, 2013]
1 Let x(0) ∈ X
2 for k = 0, . . . ,K do
3 Let γ = 2k+2
4 Find s ∈ X s.t. 〈s,∇h(x(k))〉 ≤ minsˆ∈X 〈sˆ,∇h(x(k))〉+ 12ργCh
5 Update x(k+1) = (1− γ)x(k) + γs
For the results in this paper that rely on solving approximate linear subproblems, x(i) in Algo-
rithm 3 would correspond to the K-dimensional loss vector `(c, S) ∈ [0, 1]K defined for a decision
c ∈ C on dataset S of size n.
Definition B.1. The curvature constant Ch of a convex and differentiable function h : Rn → R,
with respect to a compact domain X is defined as
Ch = sup
x,s∈X ,γ∈[0,1],y=x+γ(s−x)
2
γ2
(h(y)− h(x)− 〈y − x,∇h(x)〉)
where ∇h is the gradient of the function h.
Lemma B.2. Let h : X → R be any convex function, then using the Frank-Wolfe algorithm
(Algorithm 3), we have that for any k ≥ 1 and iterates x(k),
h(x(k))− h(x∗) ≤ 2Ch
k + 2
(1 + ρ)
where x∗ ∈ argminx∈X h(x), ρ ≥ 0 is the accuracy to which the internal linear subproblems are
solved, and Ch is the curvature constant of the function h.
Lemma B.3. Let h be a convex and differentiable Lipschitz-continuous function with gradient ∇h
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w.r.t. some norm ‖·‖ over domain X . If ∇h has Lipschitz constant βh > 0, then
Ch ≤ diam‖·‖ (X )
2βh
where diam‖·‖(X ) is the diameter of X .
Now we describe how to solve constrained group objective optimization using the Frank-Wolfe
algorithm as opposed to the algorithm of Alabi et al. [2018].
B.1 Frank-Wolfe Algorithm for Constrained Group-Objective Optimization
In this section, we present a projection-free algorithm based on Frank-Wolfe that solves the con-
strained group-objective optimization problem without privacy considerations.
In each iteration t ∈ [T ], Algorithm 4 solves the following linear sub-problem
ct+1 = argmin
c∈C
〈 (∇f(`(ct, S)) +G · 1[g(`(ct, S)) ≥ 0] · ∇g(`(ct, S))), `(c, S) 〉
and then “moves” towards ct+1 by a multiplicative factor of
2
t+2 . We show that after T =
O
(
K
√
K
α2
log K
√
K
α2
)
iterations we will get a decision cˆ that is within α (in terms of f, g) of the
optimal decision c∗ ∈ argminc∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0 f(`(c, S)). The function Unif({c1, . . . , cT }) returns cˆ that
predicts with decision ci with probability
1
T for any i ∈ [T ].
Algorithm 4: Iterative algorithm for Constrained Group-Objective Convex Optimization.
Input: argminC〈·, ·〉, T, `,∇f,∇g, S ∈ (X × Y)n, G
1
2 Pick any decision c ∈ C as c1 with l1(S) = `(c, S)
3
4 for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 do
5 ct+1 = argminc∈C〈 `(c, S), (∇f(`(ct, S)) +G · 1[g(`(ct, S)) ≥ 0] · ∇g(`(ct, S))) 〉
6 lt+1(S) =
(
1− 2t+2
)
lt(S) +
2
t+2`(ct+1, S)
7
8 return cˆ = Unif({c1, . . . , cT })
Lemma B.4. Suppose we are given convex, smooth functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R and loss function
` : C × (X × Y)n → [0, 1]K . Then for any setting of G > 0, T ≥ 3, Algorithm 4 returns a decision
cˆ ∈ C with the following guarantee:
E[f(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ f(`(c∗, S))+2K(βf +Gβg) log T
T
, E[g(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ 2K(βf +Gβg) log T
T
· 1
G
+
√
K
G
,
where c∗ ∈ argminc∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0 f(`(c, S)) is the best decision in the feasible set C, S is a dataset
of size n, βf is the smoothness parameter of the function f and βg is the smoothness parameter of
the function g. This result holds assuming access to a linear optimizer oracle.
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Proof. The intuition is to optimize w.r.t. a “new” convex, smooth function h(`(c, S)) = f(`(c, S))+
G ·max(0, g(`(c, S))) for any c ∈ C and dataset S. We rely on the primal convergence guarantees
of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. By Lemma B.2, we have that in iteration t ≥ 1, the following holds:
h(`(ct, S)) ≤ h(`(c∗, S)) + 2Ch
t+ 2
where Ch is the curvature constant of h. And by Lemma B.3, we have Ch ≤ K(βf + Gβg) where
(βf +Gβg) is the smoothness parameter of the function h. As a result we have that h(`(ct, S)) ≤
h(`(c∗, S)) + 2K(βf+Gβg)t+2 .
Then by Jensen’s inequality (Lemma A.4) and convexity of h ◦ `, we have
Ec∼{ci}Ti=1 [h(`(c, S))] ≤
1
T
T∑
t=1
h(`(ct, S)) (22)
≤ h(`(c∗, S)) + 2K(βf +Gβg)
T
(
1
3
+
1
4
+
1
5
+ . . .+
1
T + 2
)
(23)
≤ h(`(c∗, S)) + 2K(βf +Gβg) log T
T
(24)
where we used that the harmonic number HT is upper bounded by log T + 1 and that
1
T+1 +
1
T+2 <
1/2 for T ≥ 3.
We apply Lemma 4.1 to obtain that E[f(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ f(`(c∗, S))+2K(βf+Gβg) log TT and E[g(`(cˆ, S))] ≤
2K(βf+Gβg) log T
T · 1G +
√
K
G .
Corollary B.5. Suppose we are given convex, smooth functions f, g : [0, 1]K → R and loss function
` : C× (X ×Y)n → [0, 1]K . Let βf , βg be the Lipschitz constants of the gradients of f, g respectively.
Then for any setting of T ≥ 3, α > 0, Algorithm 4 returns a decision cˆ ∈ C with the following
guarantee:
E[f(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ f(`(c∗, S)) + α, and E[g(`(cˆ, S))] ≤ α,
provided that G ≥ α+
√
K
α and T ≥
2K(βf+Gβg)
α log
2K(βf+Gβg)
α where c
∗ ∈ argminc∈C:g(`(c,S))≤0 f(`(c, S))
is the best decision in the feasible set C, S is a dataset of size n, βf is the smoothness parameter of
the function f and βg is the smoothness parameter of the function g. This result holds assuming
access to a linear optimizer oracle.
Proof. The corollary follows by applying Lemmas 4.2 and B.4 where we set G ≥ α+
√
K
α and
T ≥ 2K(βf +Gβg)
α
log
2K(βf +Gβg)
α
in Algorithm 4.
C Using a Private Cost Sensitive Classification Oracle CSC′
Agarwal et al. [2018] present an exponentiated gradient algorithm for fair classification. Jagielski
et al. [2018] essentially modify this algorithm, making it differentially private, and term the new
algorithm DP-oracle-learner. DP-oracle-learner satisfies (, δ) differential privacy relying on
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a private cost sensitive classification oracle CSC′(H) in each iteration where ′ = 
4
√
T log(1/δ)
and
H is the hypothesis class to be learned.
DP-oracle-learner solves the γ-fair empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem given by:
minQ∈∆(H) eˆrr(Q)
s.t. ∀ 0 6= a ∈ A: ∆FˆP a(Q) = |FˆP a(Q)− FˆP a(Q)| ≤ γ, ∆ ˆTP a(Q) = | ˆTP a(Q)− ˆTP a(Q)| ≤ γ
where FˆP a(Q), ˆTP a(Q) are empirical estimates of FPa(Q) = P(x,y,a)[Q(x) = 1|A = a, y = 0],
TPa(Q) = P(x,y,a)[Q(x) = 1|A = a, y = 1] respectively and group 0 is used as an anchor. A is the
set of attributes with A ∈ A being the protected/sensitive attribute.
Agarwal et al. [2018] solve the following specific Lagrangian min-max problem:
min
Q∈∆(H)
max
λ∈Λ
L(Q,λ) = eˆrr(Q) + λT rˆ(Q)
where ∆(H) is the set of all randomized classifiers that can be obtained by hypotheses in H, rˆ(Q)
is a vector representing the fairness violations of the classifier Q across all groups, λ ∈ Λ = {λ :
‖λ‖1 ≤ B}, and the bound B is chosen to ensure convergence.
Now we state a main theorem from [Jagielski et al., 2018].
Theorem C.1 (Theorem 4.4 from [Jagielski et al., 2018]). Let (Q˜, λ˜) be the output of Algorithm
3, an (, δ) differentially private algorithm, in [Jagielski et al., 2018] and let Q∗ be a solution to
the non-private γ-fair ERM problem (see above definition). Then with probability at least 1− β,
eˆrr(Q˜) ≤ eˆrr(Q∗) + 2ν
and for all a 6= 0,
∆FˆP a(Q˜) ≤ γ + 1 + 2ν
B
∆ ˆTP a(Q˜) ≤ γ + 1 + 2ν
B
where ν = O˜
(
B
√
|A|
n
)
and n is the number of training examples {(xi, ai, yi)}ni=1 fed to the Algo-
rithm.
As is done in their paper, to get rid of the algorithmic-specific dependence on the eigenvalue
bound B (for example, in Theorem 4.6 of their paper), we set B = |A|. Further, since we’re
concerned with empirical risk minimization and don’t need generalization guarantees, we ignore
any factors that a learning oracle (such as CSC′(H)) might need (for example, the VC dimension
dH of the hypothesis class H) and focus on calculating the sample size n = function(α, , δ,K = |A|)
to solve the constrained group-objective optimization problem.
Corollary C.2. Let (Q˜, λ˜) be the output of Algorithm 3, an (, δ) differentially private algorithm, in
[Jagielski et al., 2018] and let Q∗ be a solution to the non-private α-fair ERM problem (see above def-
inition). Then with probability at least 9/10, in order to solve the ERM problem with classifier error
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α = (eˆrr(Q˜)−eˆrr(Q∗)) and maximum fairness violation of α = maxa∈Amax(∆FˆP a(Q˜),∆ ˆTP a(Q˜)),
we could use training examples of size
n = Θ˜
( |A|3
α2
)
.
Corollary C.2 is obtained directly from Theorem C.1 by solving for n in terms of the excess risk
and will be used as the point of comparison to compare to the work of Jagielski et al. [2018] for
solving the α-fair ERM problem (for the Equalized Odds problem) with classifier error of α with
probability at least 9/10. Further note that K = O(|A|) is the number of groups (in terminology
used in other parts of this paper). Then the sample complexity required to achieve the guarantees
in Corollary C.2 is n = Θ˜
(
K3
α2
)
.
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